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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116854
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Flamand, Sabine | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-20T11:01:21Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-20T11:01:21Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116854 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We study the decentralization of redistributive taxation in a political economy model assuming regional heterogeneity regarding both group identity and average income. If a centralized system permits a beneficial pooling of national resources, it might also decrease the degree of solidarity in the society. With no group loyalty, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization even when regions are not identical. Furthermore, increased heterogeneity need not increase the relative efficiency of decentralization. If regions are equally rich, centralization Pareto-dominates decentralization whenever group loyalty is not perfect. Finally, centralization is always more efficient than decentralization even when allowing for interregional transfers. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 47 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2010/37 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB10/37] | cat |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Flamand, 2010 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Pareto, Vilfredo, 1848-1923 Fiscal policy | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Distribució (Teoria econòmica) | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Política fiscal | - |
dc.subject.classification | Descentralització administrativa | cat |
dc.subject.other | Distribution (Economic theory) | eng |
dc.subject.other | Fiscal policy | eng |
dc.subject.other | Decentralization in government | - |
dc.title | Interregional transfers, group loyalty and the decentralization of redistribution | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB10-37_Flamand.pdf | 431.49 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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