Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863
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dc.contributor.authorEgger, Peter-
dc.contributor.authorKoethenbuerger, Marco-
dc.contributor.authorSmart, Michael-
dc.date.accessioned2017-10-20T12:37:20Z-
dc.date.available2017-10-20T12:37:20Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/116863-
dc.description.abstractThe impact electoral rules and fiscal equalization programs have for local públic finance are separately analyzed in the literature. This paper empirically analyzes whether legislator elected under different rules respond differently to changes in fiscal incentives. Using a reform of the electoral rule and the equalization system as a natural experiment, we find that municipalities which elect legislators under proportional rule react less strongly to changes in fiscal incentives.ca
dc.format.extent30 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherInstitut d’Economia de Barcelonaca
dc.relation.isformatofReproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions-
dc.relation.ispartofIEB Working Paper 2010/44-
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Egger et al., 2010-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/-
dc.sourceIEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers-
dc.subject.classificationEleccionscat
dc.subject.classificationAdministració localcat
dc.subject.classificationFederalisme-
dc.subject.classificationDret fiscalcat
dc.subject.otherElectionseng
dc.subject.otherLocal governmenteng
dc.subject.otherFederalism-
dc.subject.otherTax laweng
dc.titleElectoral rules and incentive effects of fiscal transfers: evidence from Germanyca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers

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