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Title: | Tax competition and equalization: the impact of voluntary cooperation on the efficiency goal |
Author: | Ens, Petra |
Keywords: | Relacions fiscals intergovernamentals Competència (Dret) Política fiscal Intergovernmental fiscal relations Competent authority Fiscal policy |
Issue Date: | 2009 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB09/16] |
Abstract: | Literature has long learned about the welfare improving effect of equalization in tax competition environments. By setting incentives to local authorities, public spending becomes efficient in spite of relying on a mobile resource as the tax base. This paper proves that this result cannot hold when local players have influence on the shape of the transfer system. A bargaining concerning equalization may change the incentives arising from equalization. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2009/16 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116972 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB09-16_Ens.pdf | 517.14 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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