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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240| Title: | The core and the steady bargaining set for convex games |
| Author: | Izquierdo Aznar, Josep Maria Rafels, Carles |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Funcions convexes Game theory Resource allocation Convex functions |
| Issue Date: | 2018 |
| Publisher: | Springer Verlag |
| Abstract: | Within the class of superadditive cooperative games with transferable utility, the convexity of a game is characterized by the coincidence of its core and the steady bargaining set. As a consequence it is also proved that convexity can also be characterized by the coincidence of the core of a game and the modi ed Zhou bargaining set (Shimomura, 1997) |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8 |
| It is part of: | International Journal of Game Theory, 2018, vol. 47, num. 1, p. 35-54 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/120240 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0576-8 |
| ISSN: | 0020-7276 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
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| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 675399.pdf | 301.15 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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