Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/127510
Title: The nucleolus of the assignment game. Structure of the family
Author: Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier
Rafels, Carles
Ybern, Neus
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Matemàtica financera
Models matemàtics
Game theory
Business mathematics
Mathematical models
Issue Date: 2018
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco18/386]
Abstract: We show that the family of assignment matrices which give rise to the same nucleolus forms a compact join-semilattice with one maximal element. The above family is in general not a convex set, but path-connected.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2018, E18/386
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/127510
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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