Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/128465
Title: Resource heterogeneity leads to unjust effort distribution in climate change mitigation
Author: Vicens, Julián
Bueno-Guerra, Nereida
Gutiérrez-Roig, Mario
Gracia-Lázaro, Carlos
Gómez-Gardeñes, Jesús
Perelló, Josep, 1974-
Sánchez, Angel
Moreno, Yamir
Duch i Gavaldà, Jordi
Keywords: Canvi climàtic
Teoria de jocs
Presa de decisions
Climatic change
Game theory
Decision making
Issue Date: 31-Oct-2018
Publisher: Public Library of Science (PLoS)
Abstract: Climate change mitigation is a shared global challenge that involves collective action of a set of individuals with different tendencies to cooperation. However, we lack an understanding of the effect of resource inequality when diverse actors interact together towards a common goal. Here, we report the results of a collective-risk dilemma experiment in which groups of individuals were initially given either equal or unequal endowments. We found that the effort distribution was highly inequitable, with participants with fewer resources contributing significantly more to the public goods than the richer −sometimes twice as much. An unsupervised learning algorithm classified the subjects according to their individual behavior, finding the poorest participants within two 'generous clusters' and the richest into a 'greedy cluster'. Our results suggest that policies would benefit from educating about fairness and reinforcing climate justice actions addressed to vulnerable people instead of focusing on understanding generic or global climate consequences.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204369
It is part of: PLoS One, 2018, vol. 13, num. 10, p. e020436
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/128465
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0204369
ISSN: 1932-6203
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Física de la Matèria Condensada)

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