Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/170515
Title: Índices de poder en sistemas de votación: aplicación al Brexit
Author: Del Amo Albiol, Laura
Director/Tutor: Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
Vives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963-
Keywords: Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)
Treballs de fi de grau
Presa de decisions
Països de la Unió Europea
Cooperative games (Mathematics)
Bachelor's theses
Decision making
European Union countries
Issue Date: 21-Jun-2020
Abstract: [en] In this project, it is shown how decision-making situations between different people can be represented mathematically. In particular, the focus is on voting systems in which voters make a decision and we will consider that they can form coalitions with each other in order to obtain the desired result. This will be represented by weighted voting games. Next, the power indices that are measures to know the power of a voter within a voting system will be presented. Different power indices and the properties that characterize them will be studied. Also some paradoxes that occur related to these indices are mentioned. Finally, an application of the concepts will be made to the study of the change of power in the member countries of the Council of the European Union before and after Brexit.
Note: Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2020, Director: Mikel Álvarez-Mozos i Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/170515
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

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