Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173
Title: | Deception as cooperation |
Author: | Martinez Merino, Manuel Jesus |
Keywords: | Teoria de la informació Comunicació Information theory Communication |
Issue Date: | 17-Jul-2019 |
Publisher: | Elsevier |
Abstract: | I develop a rate-distortion analysis of signaling games with imperfect common interest. Sender and receiver should be seen as jointly managing a communication channel with the objective of minimizing two independent distortion measures. I use this analysis to identify a problem with 'functional' theories of deception, and in particular Brian Skyrms's: there are perfectly cooperative, non-exploitative instances of channel management that come out as manipulative and deceptive according to those theories. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101184 |
It is part of: | Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 2019, vol. 77, p. 101184 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171173 |
Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2019.101184 |
ISSN: | 1369-8486 |
Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia) |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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694198.pdf | 1.97 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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