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Title: Groundwater extraction for irrigation purposes: the case of asymmetric players
Author: Chukaevay, Valeriia
Director/Tutor: Frutos Cachorro, Julia de
Marín Solano, Jesús
Keywords: Hidrologia d'aigües subterrànies
Jocs diferencials
Treballs de fi de màster
Differential games
Master's theses
Issue Date: 2020
Abstract: In this article the author studies the differential game applied to the groundwater resource exploited in a common property regime. The game is solved for two agents, who differ in their water demand (demand asymmetry) as well as in time-preferences (discount rates asymmetry). The author tries to investigate if the cooperation is more beneficial than non-cooperation and if an increase in asymmetry has influence on the efficiency of the solutions. The results show that the more heterogeneous the agents are, the less inefficient is the allocation of water under non-cooperation. Moreover, the cooperation can be considered beneficial for the environment, but not for the agents: a player with lower demand suffers losses in terms of welfare, when the demand asymmetry is high.
Note: Treballs Finals del Màster d'Economia, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2019-2020, Tutor: Julia de Frutos Cachorro ; Jesús Marín-Solano
Appears in Collections:Màster Oficial - Economia

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