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Title: Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players
Author: De-Paz, Albert
Marín Solano, Jesús
Navas, Jorge
Keywords: Cooperativisme
Teoria de jocs
Game theory
Issue Date: 2011
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco11/253]
Abstract: In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.
Note: Reproducció del document publicat a:
It is part of: Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia), 2011, E11/253
Appears in Collections:Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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