Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/185762
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dc.contributor.advisorVives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963--
dc.contributor.authorTena Rodriguez, Guillem-
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-19T08:03:28Z-
dc.date.available2022-05-19T08:03:28Z-
dc.date.issued2021-06-20-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/185762-
dc.descriptionTreballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2021, Director: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàliaca
dc.description.abstract[en] In 1951, John Forbes Nash defined a solution concept for games with two or more players which today is known as Nash equilibrium. We will study these equilibria for games that are repeated infinitely, and we will see the proof of the existence of these solutions, made by James W. Friedman in 1971. We will focus on two of the most known games, the prisoner’s dilemma and the Cournot’s oligopoly. Finally, we will perform simulations that will help us to confirm the equilibrium results.ca
dc.format.extent69 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isocatca
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd (c) Guillem Tena Rodriguez, 2021-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceTreballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques-
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocsca
dc.subject.classificationTreballs de fi de grau-
dc.subject.classificationJocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica)ca
dc.subject.classificationEquilibri (Economia)ca
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisionsca
dc.subject.otherGame theoryen
dc.subject.otherBachelor's theses-
dc.subject.otherNoncooperative games (Mathematics)en
dc.subject.otherEquilibrium (Economics)en
dc.subject.otherDecision makingen
dc.titleJocs repetits infinitamentca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesisca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques

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