Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370| Title: | On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games |
| Author: | Atay, Ata Solymosi, Tamás |
| Keywords: | Negociació Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Teoria de jocs Negotiation Cooperative games (Mathematics) Game theory |
| Issue Date: | 1-Jun-2018 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
| Abstract: | We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989). |
| Note: | Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022 |
| It is part of: | Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 167, p. 99-103 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/199370 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.03.022 |
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 716841.pdf | 294.22 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License
