Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/200632
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dc.contributor.authorJané Ballarín, Martí-
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-14T06:50:59Z-
dc.date.available2023-07-14T06:50:59Z-
dc.date.issued2023-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/200632-
dc.description.abstractWe propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index. Within the field of power indices, the new measure extends the Deegan-Packel power index to situations with restricted cooperation. In general, the class of games we study are not simple; with this in mind, we will introduce the essential coalitions as an analogue to the minimal winning coalitions of a simple game, since they generalize some relevant properties. We will first define the new index in terms of three reasonable assumptions, with a similar flavor to those used for the Deegan-Packel index; then, we will formally characterize the index. Finally, through numeric examples, we compare the essential coalitions index to the probabilistic Deegan-Packel index. We see that, in the latter's domain, the two indices only differ by a constant factor. Moreover, the new index is fit to analyze power in the formation of stable coalitions to run a government or a company board.ca
dc.format.extent21 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresaca
dc.relation.ispartofUB Economics – Working Papers, 2023 E23/449cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-Eco23/449]ca
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Jané Ballarín, 2023-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceUB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]-
dc.subject.classificationJocs cooperatius (Matemàtica)cat
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de jocscat
dc.subject.classificationTeoria de l'estimaciócat
dc.subject.otherCooperative games (Mathematics)eng
dc.subject.otherGame theoryeng
dc.subject.otherEstimation theoryeng
dc.titleThe essential coalitions index in games with restricted cooperationca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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