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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Jané Ballarín, Martí | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-14T06:50:59Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2023-07-14T06:50:59Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/200632 | - |
dc.description.abstract | We propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index. Within the field of power indices, the new measure extends the Deegan-Packel power index to situations with restricted cooperation. In general, the class of games we study are not simple; with this in mind, we will introduce the essential coalitions as an analogue to the minimal winning coalitions of a simple game, since they generalize some relevant properties. We will first define the new index in terms of three reasonable assumptions, with a similar flavor to those used for the Deegan-Packel index; then, we will formally characterize the index. Finally, through numeric examples, we compare the essential coalitions index to the probabilistic Deegan-Packel index. We see that, in the latter's domain, the two indices only differ by a constant factor. Moreover, the new index is fit to analyze power in the formation of stable coalitions to run a government or a company board. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 21 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa | ca |
dc.relation.ispartof | UB Economics – Working Papers, 2023 E23/449 | cat |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-Eco23/449] | ca |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Jané Ballarín, 2023 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | * |
dc.source | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] | - |
dc.subject.classification | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Teoria de jocs | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Teoria de l'estimació | cat |
dc.subject.other | Cooperative games (Mathematics) | eng |
dc.subject.other | Game theory | eng |
dc.subject.other | Estimation theory | eng |
dc.title | The essential coalitions index in games with restricted cooperation | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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E23-449_JaneBallarin.pdf | 424.64 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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