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https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218675| Title: | Optimal discounts in green public procurement |
| Author: | Chiappinelli, Olga Seres, Gyula |
| Keywords: | Política ambiental Contractes administratius Subhastes Política de despesa pública Environmental policy Public contracts Auctions Government spending policy |
| Issue Date: | 1-May-2024 |
| Publisher: | Elsevier B.V. |
| Abstract: | We provide an auction-theoretical analysis of Green Public Procurement (GPP) as a preferential program aimed at stimulating investment in green technologies. We find that GPP incentivizes more competitive firms to invest. We also show that GPP can be an optimal mechanism for a procurer who cares about minimizing the purchasing price while triggering green investment. |
| Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705 |
| It is part of: | Economics Letters, 2024, vol. 238, num.May, p. 1-4 |
| URI: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218675 |
| Related resource: | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111705 |
| ISSN: | 0165-1765 |
| Appears in Collections: | Articles publicats en revistes (Economia) |
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| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 861605.pdf | 481.22 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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