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Title: | Assortative multisided assignment games. The extreme core points [WP] |
Author: | Martínez de Albéniz, F. Javier Rafels, Carles Ybern, Neus |
Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Matemàtica financera Models matemàtics Assignació de recursos Game theory Business mathematics Mathematical models Resource allocation |
Issue Date: | 2019 |
Publisher: | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-Eco19/395] |
Abstract: | We analyze assortative multisided assignment games, following Sherstyuk (1999) and Martínez-de-Albéniz et al. (2019). In them players’ abilities are complementary across types (i.e. supermodular), and also the output of the essential coalitions is increasing depending on types. We study the extreme core points and show a simple mechanism to compute all of them. In this way we describe the whole core. This mechanism works from the original data array and the maximum number of extreme core points is obtained. |
It is part of: | UB Economics – Working Papers, 2019, E19/395 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/144180 |
Appears in Collections: | Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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E19-395_MtznezAlbeniz+Rafels.pdf | 400.42 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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