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Title: On Convexity in Games with Externalities
Author: Alonso-Meijide, José Mª
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
Fiestras-Janeiro, M. Gloria, 1962-
Jiménez-Losada, Andrés
Keywords: Externalitats (Economia)
Teoria de jocs
Optimització matemàtica
Funcions convexes
Externalities (Economics)
Game theory
Mathematical optimization
Convex functions
Issue Date: 2019
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco19/398]
Abstract: We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2019, E19/398
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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