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Title: | Voting under the threat of secession: accommodation vs. repression |
Author: | Anesi, Vincent Donder, Philippe de |
Keywords: | Autodeterminació nacional Eleccions National self-determination Elections |
Issue Date: | 2011 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB11/40] |
Abstract: | We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to accommodate the minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We first show the existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and most prefers a government’s type that is biased in favor of the minority. We then propose a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium and perform the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium policy location and of the secession risk with respect to several parameters: the cultural distinctiveness of the two regions, the relative weight attached by voters to econòmic (centripetal) -as opposed to (centrifugal) ideological- factors, the relative size of the minority region, the (exogenous) probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the intra-regional heterogeneity of preferences. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2011/40 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116592 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB11-40_Anesi.pdf | 341.49 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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