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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646
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DC Field | Value | Language |
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dc.contributor.author | Chirinko, Robert S. | - |
dc.contributor.author | Wilson, Daniel J. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-16T15:05:38Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2017-10-16T15:05:38Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent. We depart from this assumption by allowing policymakers to be influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses. Campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, we find that contributions have a significant direct effect on tax policy, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4, the slope of the tax reaction function is negative, and the empirical results are sensitive to state effects. | ca |
dc.format.extent | 44 p. | - |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | - |
dc.language.iso | eng | ca |
dc.publisher | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona | ca |
dc.relation.isformatof | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions | - |
dc.relation.ispartof | IEB Working Paper 2010/02 | - |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | [WP E-IEB10/02] | cat |
dc.rights | cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Chirinko et al., 2010 | - |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | - |
dc.source | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers | - |
dc.subject.classification | Campanyes electorals | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Anàlisi de dades de panel | cat |
dc.subject.classification | Política fiscal | - |
dc.subject.other | Political campaigns | eng |
dc.subject.other | Panel analysis | eng |
dc.subject.other | Fiscal policy | - |
dc.title | Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. States | ca |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | ca |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | ca |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
Files in This Item:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB10-02_Chirinko+Wilson.pdf | 607.13 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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