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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646
Title: | Can lower tax rates be bought? Business rent-seeking and tax competition among U.S. States |
Author: | Chirinko, Robert S. Wilson, Daniel J. |
Keywords: | Campanyes electorals Anàlisi de dades de panel Política fiscal Political campaigns Panel analysis Fiscal policy |
Issue Date: | 2010 |
Publisher: | Institut d’Economia de Barcelona |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-IEB10/02] |
Abstract: | The standard model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly benevolent. We depart from this assumption by allowing policymakers to be influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses. Campaign contributions may affect tax competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions. Based on a panel of 48 U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, we find that contributions have a significant direct effect on tax policy, the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4, the slope of the tax reaction function is negative, and the empirical results are sensitive to state effects. |
Note: | Reproducció del document publicat a: http://www.ieb.ub.edu/2012022157/ieb/ultimes-publicacions |
It is part of: | IEB Working Paper 2010/02 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/116646 |
Appears in Collections: | IEB (Institut d’Economia de Barcelona) – Working Papers |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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IEB10-02_Chirinko+Wilson.pdf | 607.13 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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