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http://hdl.handle.net/2445/185762| Title: | Jocs repetits infinitament |
| Author: | Tena Rodriguez, Guillem |
| Director/Tutor: | Vives i Santa Eulàlia, Josep, 1963- |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Treballs de fi de grau Jocs no cooperatius (Matemàtica) Equilibri (Economia) Presa de decisions Game theory Bachelor's theses Noncooperative games (Mathematics) Equilibrium (Economics) Decision making |
| Issue Date: | 20-Jun-2021 |
| Abstract: | [en] In 1951, John Forbes Nash defined a solution concept for games with two or more players which today is known as Nash equilibrium. We will study these equilibria for games that are repeated infinitely, and we will see the proof of the existence of these solutions, made by James W. Friedman in 1971. We will focus on two of the most known games, the prisoner’s dilemma and the Cournot’s oligopoly. Finally, we will perform simulations that will help us to confirm the equilibrium results. |
| Note: | Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2021, Director: Josep Vives i Santa Eulàlia |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/185762 |
| Appears in Collections: | Treballs Finals de Grau (TFG) - Matemàtiques |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| tfg_tena_rodriguez_guillem.pdf | Memòria | 2.75 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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