Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605
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dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata-
dc.contributor.authorMauleon, Ana-
dc.contributor.authorVannetelbosch, Vincent-
dc.date.accessioned2022-12-15T11:16:10Z-
dc.date.available2022-12-15T11:16:10Z-
dc.date.issued2022-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605-
dc.description.abstractWe consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.ca
dc.format.extent49 p.-
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf-
dc.language.isoengca
dc.publisherUniversitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresaca
dc.relation.ispartofUB Economics – Working Papers, 2022, E22/437cat
dc.relation.ispartofseries[WP E-Eco22/437]ca
dc.rightscc-by-nc-nd, (c) Atay et al., 2022-
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/*
dc.sourceUB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]-
dc.subject.classificationElecció d'escolacat
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisions (Estadística)cat
dc.subject.otherSchool choiceeng
dc.subject.otherStatistical decisioneng
dc.titleSchool choice with farsighted studentsca
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperca
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessca
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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