Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605
Title: School choice with farsighted students
Author: Atay, Ata
Mauleon, Ana
Vannetelbosch, Vincent
Keywords: Elecció d'escola
Presa de decisions (Estadística)
School choice
Statistical decision
Issue Date: 2022
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco22/437]
Abstract: We consider priority-based school choice problems with farsighted students. We show that a singleton set consisting of the matching obtained from the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism is a farsighted stable set. However, the matching obtained from the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism may not belong to any farsighted stable set. Hence, the TTC mechanism provides an assignment that is not only Pareto efficient but also farsightedly stable. Moreover, looking forward three steps ahead is already sufficient for stabilizing the matching obtained from the TTC.
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2022, E22/437
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/191605
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]

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