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Title: | The essential coalitions index in games with restricted cooperation |
Author: | Jané Ballarín, Martí |
Keywords: | Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Teoria de jocs Teoria de l'estimació Cooperative games (Mathematics) Game theory Estimation theory |
Issue Date: | 2023 |
Publisher: | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa |
Series/Report no: | [WP E-Eco23/449] |
Abstract: | We propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index. Within the field of power indices, the new measure extends the Deegan-Packel power index to situations with restricted cooperation. In general, the class of games we study are not simple; with this in mind, we will introduce the essential coalitions as an analogue to the minimal winning coalitions of a simple game, since they generalize some relevant properties. We will first define the new index in terms of three reasonable assumptions, with a similar flavor to those used for the Deegan-Packel index; then, we will formally characterize the index. Finally, through numeric examples, we compare the essential coalitions index to the probabilistic Deegan-Packel index. We see that, in the latter's domain, the two indices only differ by a constant factor. Moreover, the new index is fit to analyze power in the formation of stable coalitions to run a government or a company board. |
It is part of: | UB Economics – Working Papers, 2023 E23/449 |
URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/200632 |
Appears in Collections: | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] |
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File | Description | Size | Format | |
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E23-449_JaneBallarin.pdf | 424.64 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
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