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2019-06

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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150705

One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands: core and competitive equilibrium

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12166

Resum

We consider an assignment market with one seller who owns several indivisible heterogeneous goods and many buyers each willing to buy up to a given capacity. In this market, the core contains the Vickrey payoff vector. However, core allocations may not be supported by competitive equilibrium prices, even in a finite replication of the market. We first characterize the convexity of the associated coalitional game and we show that it is a sufficient condition so that the buyers‐optimal core allocation is competitive. With respect to the seller‐optimal core allocation, we provide a characterization of competitiveness by means of buyers' valuations. In addition, we characterize in terms of the valuation matrix the coincidence between the core and the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.

Matèries

Agents comercials, Economia de mercat, Models economètrics, Equilibri (Economia)

Matèries (anglès)

Commercial agents, Market economy, Econometric models, Equilibrium (Economics)

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citació

ROBLES JIMÉNEZ, Francisco Javier and NÚÑEZ, Marina (Núñez Oliva). One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands: core and competitive equilibrium. International Journal of Economic Theory. 2019. Vol. 15, num. 2, pags. 169-182. ISSN 1742-7355. [consulted: 19 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/150705

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