Dijous 11 de juny, el Dipòsit Digital no estarà operatiu de 15:00 a 17:00 h per tasques de manteniment. Disculpeu les molèsties.
El jueves 11 de Junio, el Dipòsit Digital no estará operativo de 15:00 a 17:00 h debido a tareas de mantenimiento. Disculpen las molestias.
Thursday, Jun 11th, the Digital Repository will be unavailable due to a system update.

Document type

Article

Version

Accepted version

Publication date

All rights reserved

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/178068

Core allocations in Co-investment problems

Journal Title

Director/Tutor

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Abstract

In a co-investment problem a set of agents face a surplus-sharing situation with a single input and a single output exhibiting increasing average returns. All agents contribute their respective inputs and expect part of the collective output. Focusing on the core of the problem, we analyze whether a core allocation of the output is acceptable or compatible with a variation on input contributions, where larger payoffs are expected by those agents whose contribution is increased. We state a necessary and sufficient condition for a core allocation to be acceptable. We also introduce and study the acceptable core, that is, those core allocations acceptable with respect to any possible increase of inputs. Finally we axiomatically characterize when a set-solution that contains acceptable core allocations shrinks into the proportional allocation.

Citation

Citation

IZQUIERDO AZNAR, Josep Maria and RAFELS, Carles. Core allocations in Co-investment problems. Group Decision and Negotiation. 2020. Vol. 29, num. 1157-1180. ISSN 0926-2644. [consulted: 11 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/178068

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record