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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/202480
You shall not lie nor mislead (unless it is a need)
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In this paper, I defend the thesis that we have no grounds to say that misleading is morally
preferable to lying. For this purpose, I first examine all the relevant philosophical positions
on the discussion of the moral standing of lying in contrast with misleading, reviewing not
only the main arguments for each one but also specific objections against most of them.
Then, I carefully analyze Herzog’s very recent argument which seems to be in favor of the
traditional idea that misleading is better than lying and give reasons as to why her proposal is
not convincing. Since Herzog's attempt to defend the traditional view is unsuccessful, as
previous ones made by other philosophers, I argue that, in general, we have no good reason to
think of misleading as a respectable alternative to lying.
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Màster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2023-2024, Director/Tutor: Teresa Marques
Matèries (anglès)
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HUETE RODRÍGUEZ, Andrea. You shall not lie nor mislead (unless it is a need). [consulta: 26 de novembre de 2025]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/202480]