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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199368
A bargaining set for roommate problems
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Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibility of blocking pairs. We adopt the weak stability notion of Klijn and Massó (2003) for the marriage problem and we extend it to the roommate problem. We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution concept based on the credibility of the deviations for the roommate problem: the bargaining set. We show that weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. We generalize the coincidence result for marriage problems of Klijn and Massó (2003) between the bargaining set and the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings to roommate problems. Finally, we prove that the bargaining set for roommate problems is always non-empty by making use of the coincidence result.
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ATAY, Ata, MAULEON, Ana, VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent. A bargaining set for roommate problems. _Journal of Mathematical Economics_. 2021. Vol. 94, núm. 102465, pàgs. 1-10. [consulta: 24 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 0304-4068. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199368]