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2021-05-01

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2021
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199368

A bargaining set for roommate problems

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Recurs relacionat

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.102465

Resum

Since stable matchings may not exist, we propose a weaker notion of stability based on the credibility of blocking pairs. We adopt the weak stability notion of Klijn and Massó (2003) for the marriage problem and we extend it to the roommate problem. We first show that although stable matchings may not exist, a weakly stable matching always exists in a roommate problem. Then, we adopt a solution concept based on the credibility of the deviations for the roommate problem: the bargaining set. We show that weak stability is not sufficient for a matching to be in the bargaining set. We generalize the coincidence result for marriage problems of Klijn and Massó (2003) between the bargaining set and the set of weakly stable and weakly efficient matchings to roommate problems. Finally, we prove that the bargaining set for roommate problems is always non-empty by making use of the coincidence result.

Matèries

Parella, Estabilitat, Negociació, Concordances

Matèries (anglès)

Couple, Stability, Negotiation, Concordances

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citació

ATAY, Ata, MAULEON, Ana and VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent. A bargaining set for roommate problems. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2021. Vol. 94, num. 102465, pags. 1-10. ISSN 0304-4068. [consulted: 4 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/199368

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