Files

712588.pdf (476.55 KB)

Document type

Article

Version

Accepted version

Publication date

2022-07-01

All rights reserved

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/187819

On convexity in cooperative games with externalities

Journal Title

Authors

Director/Tutor

Additional contribution

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Abstract

We introduce new notions of superadditivity and convexity for games with coalitional externalities. We show parallel results to the classic ones for transferable utility games without externalities. In superadditive games the grand coalition is the most efficient organization of agents. The convexity of a game is equivalent to having non decreasing contributions to larger embedded coalitions. We also see that convex games can only have negative externalities.

Related resource

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01371-8

Subject

Externalitats (Economia), Teoria de jocs, Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Optimització matemàtica

Subject (English)

Externalities (Economics), Game theory, Cooperative games (Mathematics), Mathematical optimization

Citation

Collections

Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

Citation

ALONSO-MEIJIDE, José Mª, et al. On convexity in cooperative games with externalities. Economic Theory. 2022. Vol. 74, num. 265-292. ISSN 0938-2259. [consulted: 8 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/187819

Export metadata

JSON - METS

Share record