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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/118810
The incentive core in co-investment problems
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We study resource-monotonicity properties of core allocations in coinvestment problems: those where a set of agents pool their endowments of a certain resource or input in order to obtain a joint surplus or output that must be allocated among the agents. We analyze whether agents have incentives to raise their initial contribution (resource-monotonicity). We focus not only on looking for potential incentives to agents who raise their contributions, but also in not harming the payoffs to the rest of agents (strong monotonicity property). A necessary and suficient condition to fulfill this property is stated and proved. We also provide a subclass of coinvestment problems for which any core allocation satisfies the aforementioned strong resource-monotonicity property. Moreover, we introduce the subset of core allocations satisfying this condition, namely the incentive core.
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IZQUIERDO AZNAR, Josep Maria and RAFELS, Carles. The incentive core in co-investment problems. UB Economics – Working Papers. 2017. Vol. E17/369. ISSN 1136-8365. [consulted: 17 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/118810