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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/192490
Axioms for optimal stable rules and fair division rules in a multiple-partners job market
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In the multiple-partners job market, introduced in (Sotomayor, 1992), each firm can hire several workers and each worker can be hired by several firms, up to a given quota. We show that, in contrast to what happens in the simple assignment game, in this extension, the firms-optimal stable rules are neither valuation monotonic nor pairwise monotonic. However, we show that the firms-optimal stable rules satisfy a weaker property, what we call firm-covariance, and that this property characterizes these rules among all stable rules. This property allows us to shed some light on how firms can (and cannot) manipulate the firms-optimal stable rules. In particular, we show that firms cannot manipulate them by constantly over-reporting their valuations. Analogous results hold when focusing on the workers. Finally, we extend to the multiple-partners market a known characterization of the fair-division rules on the domain of simple assignment games.
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DOMÈNECH I GIRONELL, Gerard, NÚÑEZ, Marina (núñez oliva). Axioms for optimal stable rules and fair division rules in a multiple-partners job market. _Games and Economic Behavior_. 2022. Vol. 136, núm. 136, pàgs. 469-484. [consulta: 29 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 0899-8256. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/192490]