Generalized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices

dc.contributor.authorAtay, Ata
dc.contributor.authorLlerena Garrés, Francesc
dc.contributor.authorNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
dc.date.accessioned2017-02-09T07:37:39Z
dc.date.available2017-10-31T23:01:41Z
dc.date.issued2016-10
dc.date.updated2017-02-09T07:37:39Z
dc.description.abstractA generalization of the classical three-sided assignment market is considered, where value is generated by pairs or triplets of agents belonging to different sectors, as well as by individuals. For these markets we represent the situation that arises when some agents leave the market with some payoff by means of a generalization of Owen (Ann Econ Stat 25-26:71-79, 1992) derived market. Consistency with respect to the derived market, together with singleness best and individual anti-monotonicity, axiomatically characterize the core for these generalized three-sided assignment markets. When one sector is formed by buyers and the other by two different type of sellers, we show that the core coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors.
dc.format.extent22 p.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.idgrec662464
dc.identifier.issn1134-5764
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/106682
dc.language.isoeng
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag
dc.relation.isformatofVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
dc.relation.ispartofTOP, 2016, vol. 24, num. 3, p. 572-593
dc.relation.urihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-016-0409-0
dc.rights(c) Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, 2016
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.sourceArticles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
dc.subject.classificationAssignació de recursos
dc.subject.classificationCompetència econòmica
dc.subject.classificationPresa de decisions (Estadística)
dc.subject.classificationMatemàtica financera
dc.subject.otherResource allocation
dc.subject.otherCompetition
dc.subject.otherStatistical decision
dc.subject.otherBusiness mathematics
dc.titleGeneralized three-sided assignment markets: core consistency and competitive prices
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion

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