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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217266
Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies
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We examine the impact of deliberation on political learning and election outcomes. A rational, common-valued electorate votes under majority rule, after potentially acquiring costly private information and sharing it freely through public deliberation. Our findings suggest that deliberation can lead to free-riding on information gathering, but also encourage the emergence of informed political experts. Overall, deliberation may legitimize purely electoral outcomes and yield more accurate decisions. However, deliberation may also reduce electoral accuracy. We provide conditions for these results and contribute to the understanding of the strengths and limitations of deliberative democracies.
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DOMÈNECH I GIRONELL, Gerard, LORECCHIO, Caio Paes Leme and TEJADA, Oriol. Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies. UB Economics – Working Papers. 2024. Vol. E24/479. [consulted: 23 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217266