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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/33973
Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
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[cat] En aquest treball caracteritzem les solucions puntuals de jocs cooperatius d'utilitat transferible que compleixen selecció del core i monotonia agregada. També mostrem que aquestes dues propietats són compatibles amb la individualitat racional, la propietat del jugador fals i la propietat de simetria. Finalment, caracteritzem les solucions puntuals que compleixen les cinc propietats a l'hora.
[eng] We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish characterizing single-valued solutions satisfying these ve properties.
[eng] We characterize single-valued solutions of transferable utility cooperative games satisfying core selection and aggregate monotonicity. Fur- thermore, we show that these two properties are compatible with individual rationality, the dummy player property and the symmetry property. We nish characterizing single-valued solutions satisfying these ve properties.
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CALLEJA, Pere, RAFELS, Carles and TIJS, Stef. Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games. Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia). 2010. Vol. E10/237. ISSN 1136-8365. [consulted: 8 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/33973