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Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach
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This article reviews some contributions on cooperative games where the Journal of Mathematical Economics has been influential, namely the games with non-transferable utility and some market games with indivisibilities. Additionally, it presents some more recent advances on two aspects of the theory of cooperative games: the introduction of externalities in the worth of the coalitions and the axiomatic characterization of solutions.
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FUNAKI, Yukihiko and NÚÑEZ, Marina (Núñez Oliva). Some advances in cooperative game theory: indivisibilities, externalities and axiomatic approach. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2024. Vol. 115. ISSN 0304-4068. [consulted: 6 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/218727