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2017-01

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108176

Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results

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https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0966-z

Abstract

On the domain of cooperative games with transferable utility, we investigate if there are single-valued solutions that reconcile individual rationality, core selection, consistency and monotonicity (with respect to the worth of the grand coalition). This paper states some impossibility results for the combination of core selection with either complement consistency (Moulin, J Econ Theory 36:120-148, 1985) or projected consistency (Funaki, Dual axiomatizations of solutions of cooperative games. Mimeo, Tokyo, 1998), and core selection, max consistency (Davis and Maschler, Naval Res Logist Q 12:223-259, 1965) and monotonicity. By contrast, possibility results are manifest when combining individual rationality, projected consistency and monotonicity.

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Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Lògica matemàtica, Economia matemàtica

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Cooperative games (Mathematics), Mathematical logic, Mathematical economics

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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CALLEJA, Pere and LLERENA GARRÉS, Francesc. Rationality, aggregate monotonicity and consistency in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. Social Choice and Welfare. 2017. Vol. 48, num. 1, pags. 197-220. ISSN 0176-1714. [consulted: 6 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/108176

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