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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2023
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/213281

Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split

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In this note, we investigate the relationship between non-manipulability via merging (splitting) and strong non-manipulability via merging (splitting). Our analysis reveals that while these two non-manipulability axioms are generally not equivalent, they do coincide when the principle of solidarity is satisfied. This principle is fulfilled by a wide range of bankruptcy rules, including parametric rules.

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CALLEJA, Pere, LLERENA GARRÉS, Francesc and SUDHÖLTER, Peter. Remarks on solidarity in bankruptcy problems when agents merge or split. Mathematical Social Sciences. 2023. Vol. 125, num. 61-64. ISSN 0165-4896. [consulted: 16 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/213281

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