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Working paper

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2015

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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/66937

Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Games with Externalities

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Abstract

We propose a generalization of simple games to sit uations with coalitional externalities. The main novelty of our generalization is a monotonicity property that we define for games in partition function form. This property allows us to properly speak about minimal winning embedded coalitions. We propose and characterize two power indices based on these kind of coalitions. We provide methods based on the multilinear extension of the game to compute the indices. Finally, the new indices are used to study the distribution of power in the current Parliament of Andalusia.

Subject

Teoria de jocs, Teoria de l'estimació, Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica), Presa de decisions (Estadística)

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Game theory, Estimation theory, Cooperative games (Mathematics), Statistical decision

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UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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ALONSO-MEIJIDE, José Mª, ÁLVAREZ-MOZOS, Mikel and FIESTRAS-JANEIRO, M. Gloria. Power Indices and Minimal Winning Coalitions in Simple Games with Externalities. UB Economics – Working Papers. 2015. Vol.  E15/328. ISSN 1136-8365. [consulted: 8 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/66937

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