Griffiths' psychoevolutionary theory of basic emotions: is the automatic appraisal mechanism informationally encapsulated?

Abstract

Griffiths argues that a system which triggers the emotional response, named automatic appraisal mechanism (AAM), is informationally encapsulated (Griffiths, 1997). After proposing a clarification of the AAM using Shea's taxonomy (Shea, 2013), I will claim that Griffiths' inference to the best explanation in favor of the informational encapsulation of the AAM is not compelling. I will present empirical evidence (Paquette et al., 2003) that is incompatible with the thesis of the informational encapsulation of the AAM in order to cast doubts on Griffiths' explanation, and I will propose an alternative one. My alternative explanation will be that the AAM is synchronically impenetrable, and I will affirm that it is preferable over Griffiths' one because is less theoretically demanding, and moreover in accordance with empirical evidence that shows the possibility of diachronic cognitive penetration of the AAM. I will conclude by claiming that this revision can provide also a better account of the irrationality of recalcitrant emotions.