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2026-01-01

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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier B.V., 2026
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224089

Maximum and minimum payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets with local monotonicity

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https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2025.10.006

Abstract

We give formulas to obtain the maximum and minimum core payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets satisfying a local monotonicity condition. These formulas are obtained directly from the multisided array of data and we provide a core allocation where these bounds are attained. Similar formulas are known from Eriksson et al. (2000) for the bilateral Becker’s assortative assignment.

Subject

Assignació de recursos, Funcions modulars, Màxims i mínims, Estudis de mercat

Subject (English)

Resource allocation, Modular functions, Maxima and minima, Market surveys

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Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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MARTÍNEZ DE ALBÉNIZ, F. Javier, RAFELS, Carles and YBERN, Neus. Maximum and minimum payoffs for supermodular multisided assignment markets with local monotonicity. Discrete Applied Mathematics. 2026. Vol. 379, num. 605-612. ISSN 0166-218X. [consulted: 18 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/224089

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