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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/189967
Persuading crowds
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A sequence of short-lived agents must choose which action to take under a fixed, but unknown, state of the world. Prior to the realization of the state, the long-lived principal designs and commits to a dynamic information policy to persuade agents toward his most preferred action. The principal's persuasion power is potentially limited by the existence of conditionally independent and identically distributed private signals for the agents as well as their ability to observe the history of past actions. I characterize the problem for the principal in terms of a dynamic belief manipulation mechanism and analyze its implications for social learning. For a class of private information structure - the log-concave class, I derive conditions under which the principal should encourage some social learning and when he should induce herd behavior from the start (single disclosure). I also show that social learning is less valuable to a more patient principal: as his discount factor converges to one, the value of any optimal policy converges to the value of the single disclosure policy.
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LORECCHIO, Caio Paes Leme. Persuading crowds. UB Economics – Working Papers. 2022. Vol. E22/434. [consulted: 9 of October of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/189967