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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/57175
One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands
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We consider one-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands and prove that the associated game is buyers-submodular. Therefore the core is non-empty and it has a lattice structure which contains the allocation where every buyer receives his marginal contribution. We prove that in this kind of market, every pairwise-stable outcome is associated to a competitive equilibrium and viceversa. We study conditions under which the buyers-optimal and the seller-optimal core allocations are competitive equilibrium payoff vectors. Moreover, we characterize the markets for which the core coincidences with the set of competitive equilibria payoff vectors. When agents behave strategically, we introduce a procedure that implements the buyers-optimal core allocation as the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome.
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ROBLES JIMÉNEZ, Francisco javier, NÚÑEZ, Marina (núñez oliva). One-seller assignment markets with multi-unit demands. _UB Economics – Working Papers_. 2014. Vol. E14/316. [consulta: 24 de gener de 2026]. ISSN: 1136-8365. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/57175]