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cc-by-nc-nd, (c) Tejada, 2009
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/43651

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

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[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.
[eng] I prove that, in assignment markets with more than two sides, agents of different sides (or sectors) need not be complements, whereas agents of the same side need not be substitutes. Shapley (1962) showed that this cannot happen when assignment markets are bilateral. Nevertheless, I found sufficient conditions, that always hold for bilateral markets, that guarantee substitutability and a extended notion of complementarity among agents in arbitrary multilateral assignment markets. I also prove that Shapley’s (1962) result always holds regardless the number of sectors of the market when goods in the market are homogeneous.

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TEJADA, Oriol. Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets. Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia). 2009. Vol.  E09/229. ISSN 1136-8365. [consulted: 8 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/43651

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