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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514
A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
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We consider a package allocation problem in which a seller owns many indivisible objects and the rest of the agents, buyers, are interested in packages of these objects. Buyers' valuations satisfy monotonicity and the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). The aim of this paper is to analyze the following mechanism: simultaneously, each buyer requests to the seller a package by announcing how much he would pay for it; once buyers have played, the seller decides the final assignment of packages and the prices, as long as this assignment makes no buyer worse off than with his initial request. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the Vickrey outcome (Vickrey, 1961) of the market.
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NÚÑEZ, Marina (Núñez Oliva), RAFELS, Carles i ROBLES JIMÉNEZ, Francisco Javier. A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2020. Vol. 87, núm. March, pàgs. 6-14. ISSN 0304-4068. [consulta: 8 de maig de 2026]. Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514