Document type
ArticleVersion
Accepted versionPublication date
Publication license
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514
A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
Journal Title
Director/Tutor
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Related resource
Abstract
We consider a package allocation problem in which a seller owns many indivisible objects and the rest of the agents, buyers, are interested in packages of these objects. Buyers' valuations satisfy monotonicity and the gross substitutes condition (Kelso and Crawford, 1982). The aim of this paper is to analyze the following mechanism: simultaneously, each buyer requests to the seller a package by announcing how much he would pay for it; once buyers have played, the seller decides the final assignment of packages and the prices, as long as this assignment makes no buyer worse off than with his initial request. The subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the mechanism correspond to the Vickrey outcome (Vickrey, 1961) of the market.
Subject (English)
Citation
Citation
NÚÑEZ, Marina (Núñez Oliva), RAFELS, Carles and ROBLES JIMÉNEZ, Francisco Javier. A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes. Journal of Mathematical Economics. 2020. Vol. 87, num. March, pags. 6-14. ISSN 0304-4068. [consulted: 7 of June of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/154514