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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/34394
Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets
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[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.
[eng] We extend Rochford’s (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive -and use as a threat- in her preferred alternative matching to the optimal matching that is formed. We prove that, for balanced multi-sided assignment games, the set of SMB is always nonempty and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide in general with the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983) by introducing a kernel based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB.
[eng] We extend Rochford’s (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive -and use as a threat- in her preferred alternative matching to the optimal matching that is formed. We prove that, for balanced multi-sided assignment games, the set of SMB is always nonempty and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide in general with the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983) by introducing a kernel based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB.
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TEJADA, Oriol and RAFELS, Carles. Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets. Documents de treball (Facultat d'Economia i Empresa. Espai de Recerca en Economia). 2009. Vol. E09/216. ISSN 1136-8365. [consulted: 11 of August of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/34394