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Title: An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game
Author: Atay, Ata
Keywords: Teoria de jocs
Assignació de recursos
Àlgebres de Von Neumann
Problema de Neumann
Game theory
Resource allocation
Von Neumann algebras
Neumann problema
Issue Date: 2016
Publisher: Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa
Series/Report no: [WP E-Eco16/350]
Abstract: Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002)
It is part of: UB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/350
ISSN: 1136-8365
Appears in Collections:UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE]
Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)

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