Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040| Title: | An alternative proof of the characterization of core stability for the assignment game [WP] |
| Author: | Atay, Ata |
| Keywords: | Teoria de jocs Assignació de recursos Àlgebres de Von Neumann Problema de Neumann Game theory Resource allocation Von Neumann algebras Neumann problema |
| Issue Date: | 2016 |
| Publisher: | Universitat de Barcelona. Facultat d'Economia i Empresa |
| Series/Report no: | [WP E-Eco16/350] |
| Abstract: | Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize the stability of the core of the assignment game by means of a property of the valuation matrix. They show that the core of an assignment game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set if and only if its valuation matrix has a dominant diagonal. Their proof makes use of some graphtheoretical tools, while the present proof relies on the notion of buyer-seller exact representative in Núñez and Rafels (2002) |
| It is part of: | UB Economics – Working Papers, 2016, E16/350 |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/2445/102040 |
| ISSN: | 1136-8365 |
| Appears in Collections: | UB Economics – Working Papers [ERE] Documents de treball (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial) |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| E16-350_Atay_Alternative.pdf | 402.77 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a
Creative Commons License
