Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/146137
Title: Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief
Author: Palmira, Michele
Keywords: Teoria del coneixement
Lògica
Theory of knowledge
Logic
Issue Date: Jun-2018
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Abstract: This paper addresses a largely neglected question in ongoing debates over disagreement: what is the relation, if any, between disagreements involving credences (call them credal disagreements) and disagreements involving outright beliefs (call them full disagreements)? The first part of the paper offers some desiderata for an adequate account of credal and full disagreement. The second part of the paper argues that both phenomena can be subsumed under a schematic definition which goes as follows: A and B disagree if and only if the accuracy conditions of A's doxastic attitude are such that, if they were fulfilled, this would ipso facto make B's doxastic attitude inaccurate, or vice‐versa.
Note: Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12163
It is part of: Ratio, 2018, vol. 31, num. 2, p. 179-196
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/146137
Related resource: https://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12163
ISSN: 0034-0006
Appears in Collections:Articles publicats en revistes (Filosofia)

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