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Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions
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Several philosophers advance substantive theories of propositions, to deal with several issues they raise in connection with a concern with a long pedigree in philosophy, the problem of the unity of propositions. The qualification ‘substantive’ is meant to contrast with ‘minimal’ or ‘deflationary’ – roughly, views that reject that propositions have a hidden nature, worth investigating. Substantive views appear to create spurious problems by characterizing propositions in ways that make them unfit to perform their theoretical jobs. I will present in this light some critical points against Hanks’ (2015, 2019) act-theoretic view, and Recanati’s (2019) recent elaboration of Hanks’ notion of cancellation. Both Hanks and Recanati, I’ll argue, rely on problematic conceptions of fiction and pretense.
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GARCÍA-CARPINTERO, Manuel. Pretense, cancellation, and the act theory of propositions. _Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy_. 2021. [consulta: 10 de desembre de 2025]. ISSN: 0020-174X. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/208370]