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Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/228960
Artifacts' Intention-Essentialism and the Production of Negative and Queer Objects
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Artifacts are mind-dependent objects; they exist by virtue of the intentional activity of their makers, at least according to what philosophers usually defend. Some philosophers consider arti facts to be causally and essentially dependent on the intentions of their original makers—a position that we will call Artifacts’ Inten tion-Essentialism. Although this position is very attractive, it suf fers from various problems. This paper focuses on a discussion of two of those problems: the possibility of creating negative, and queer objects. The first criticism was originally raised by Evnine (2016) against Thomasson’s view, but our aim is to defend this criticism for all Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism views, including Evnine’s. The second problem is a new issue regarding how easy it would be to create queer kinds of artifacts if we accept Artifacts’ Intention-Essentialism.
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SOLÍS, Adrián. Artifacts' Intention-Essentialism and the Production of Negative and Queer Objects. Organon F. 2025. Vol. 32, num. 4, pags. 457-485. ISSN 1335-0668. [consulted: 20 of November of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/228960