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cc-by-nc-nd (c) Marques, Teresa i Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2006
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/231030

Pode o deflacionismo negar a bivalência?

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The simplest and most widely endorsed elucidation of the notions of truth and falsehood is given in Aristotle's dictum: 'to say of what is not that it is, and of what is that it is not, is false; while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true'. Nowadays, while some take the dictum as the first Statement of truth as correspondence, the dictum may also be seen as a first Statement of deflationism. Deflationism holds that the essential about truth is captured in equivalence schemas for truth. Similar schemas are usually put forward for falsity. Can deflationism coherently deny bivalence? I will argue that it cannot since the putative counterexamples to bivalence also falsify the relevant truth-schemas. The attempts made to render the supposition of counter examples to bivalence compatible with the truth-schemas usually take two steps: in the first place, they try to deal with the way we can reject that a relevant item is bivalent without self-contradiction, and, in the second place, they try to explain how, although there are gaps, the schemas for truth and falsehood are still correct. I will argue that these attempts fail, since they are ad hoc or generally ungrounded. So, either deflationism is in adequate as an account of truth, or there cannot be counterexamples to bivalence. I conclude that it is not only deflationism that faces this dilemma; anyone who defends that some version or other of the truth-schemas is correct faces the same difficulties as the deflationist. This would corne as no surprise for Aristotle. His dictum about truth was followed by a Statement of bivalence: 'so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false'.

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MARQUES, Teresa. Pode o deflacionismo negar a bivalência?. Philosophica. 2006. Vol. 14, num. 28, pags. 227-244. ISSN 0872-4784. [consulted: 19 of November of 2026]. Available at: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/231030

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