Carregant...
Tipus de document
Document de treballData de publicació
Llicència de publicació
Si us plau utilitzeu sempre aquest identificador per citar o enllaçar aquest document: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116655
Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability
Títol de la revista
Autors
Director/Tutor
ISSN de la revista
Títol del volum
Recurs relacionat
Resum
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive and negative externalities and show that centralization may not be efficient in economies with positive externalities even when regions are identical and centralization does not entail a loss of accountability. We also show that decentralization can only Pareto dominate centralization in economies with negative externalities.
Matèries
Matèries (anglès)
Citació
Citació
AIDT, Toke, DUTTA, Jayasri. Fiscal federalism and electoral accountability. _IEB Working Paper 2010/11_. [consulta: 27 de gener de 2026]. [Disponible a: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/116655]